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# Unapproved Techniques

## BACKGROUND

It has been discovered that in past events, Operators have introduced techniques which were not in agreement with the Manufacturer's recommendations. In one example, the NTSB determined<sup>1</sup> *"that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of [Operator's] Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program."* Despite concerns from both the operator's technical pilot and the aircraft manufacturer, this particular program, originally designed to counteract aircraft upsets, was used in the Operator's training syllabus.

## IFALPA POSITION

Operators should only provide information on techniques and procedures for the operation of the aircraft which have been approved by the Competent Authority responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft.

Operators should not require crews to apply any unapproved techniques or procedures during any operations.

For any technique or procedure which affects the technical operation of the aircraft to a greater extent, e.g., the resulting risk is greater than "low risk" according to ICAO SMM (Doc 9859), to be considered as approved in the operations manual, the operator should use the following process:

1. The technique or procedure should firstly have been developed, or agreed upon as acceptable, by the manufacturer or type certificate holder.
2. The technique or procedure developed in para (1) should also be required to have been accepted by the Authority responsible for the issue of the type certificate.

When stages (1) and (2) have been met, the technique or procedure should be approved or accepted by the Competent Authority responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft.

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<sup>1</sup> [NTSB report](#) on In-Flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer American Airlines Flight 587 Airbus Industry A300-605R, N14053 Belle Harbor, New York November 12, 2001