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**IFALPA TECHNICAL MANUAL  
ANNEX 6**

**OPERATION OF  
AIRCRAFT**

**PART I - INTERNATIONAL  
COMMERCIAL AIR  
TRANSPORT**

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**CHAPTER 1 DEFINITIONS****DECISION ALTITUDE (DA) OR DECISION HEIGHT (DH)**

The ICAO definition of decision altitude (DA) or decision height (DH) is "A specified altitude or height in a 3D instrument approach operation at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual reference to continue the approach has not been established."

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*Note 1. - Decision altitude (DA) is referenced to mean sea level and decision height (DH) is referenced to the threshold elevation.*

*Note 2. - The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position, in relation to the desired flight path. In Category III operations with a decision height the required visual reference is that specified for the particular procedure and operation.*

*Note 3. - For convenience when both expressions are used they may be written in the form "decision altitude/height" and abbreviated "DA/H".*

**IFALPA POLICY**

Note 2 should be amended as follows:

"The required visual reference means that section of the visual aids or of the approach area which should have been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment that the landing could be made visually without further reference to the position and guidance instruments. When flying by external visual reference, the pilot should be able to obtain from the visual cues, guidance in azimuth, roll, glide-path and pitch. In addition, the calculation of the DA or DH should take into account human motor reaction times, predictable altimeter error and the antenna/wheel geometry."

**POL-STAT 1988**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2010*

**EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER (ELT)**

The ICAO definition of Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) is "A generic term describing equipment which broadcast distinctive signals on designated frequencies and, depending on application, may be automatically activated by impact or be manually activated. An ELT may be any of the following:

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*Automatic fixed ELT (ELT (AF)). An automatically activated ELT which is permanently attached to an aircraft.*

*Automatic portable ELT (ELT (AP)). An automatically activated ELT which is rigidly attached to an aircraft but readily removable from the aircraft.*

*Automatic deployable ELT (ELT (AD)). An ELT which is rigidly attached to an aircraft and which is automatically deployed and activated by impact, and, in some cases, also by hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided.*

*Survival ELT (ELT(S)). An ELT which is removable from an aircraft, stowed so as to facilitate its ready use in an emergency, and manually activated by survivors.*

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**IFALPA POLICY**

The 4<sup>th</sup> paragraph above should be amended to read as follows:

Automatic deployable and Floatable ELT (ELT (ADF)). An ELT which is rigidly attached to an aircraft and which is automatically deployed and is floatable and activated by impact **and/or** hydrostatic sensors. Manual deployment is also provided.

**POL-STAT 2015  
(ATS)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

The following new definition should be added to the ICAO list:

**“Low visibility condition.-** A visibility of 400 metres or below.  
Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) shall be enforced whenever the visibility reported on the movement area by ATC, the meteorological report, or by pilot report, is 400 metres or below.”

**POL-STAT 2007**

## CHAPTER 2 APPLICABILITY

ICAO Chapter 2 states that *"The Standards and Recommended Practices contained in Annex 6, Part I, shall be applicable to the operation of aeroplanes by operators authorised to conduct international commercial air transport operations."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

### IFALPA POLICY

All aeroplanes operated for the carriage of passengers or cargo on commercial services shall be compliant with the appropriate operational standards for transport category aeroplanes.

**POL-STAT 2004**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Jun**  
**2014**

**CHAPTER 3 GENERAL****3.1 COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES**

**ICAO para. 3.1.7** states that *"operators shall ensure that pilots-in-command have available on board the aeroplane all the essential information concerning the search and rescue services in the area over which the aeroplane will be flown."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

*Note. - This information may be made available to the pilot by means of the operations manual or such other means as is considered appropriate.*

**IFALPA POLICY**

A new paragraph should be added to Chapter 3, after 3.1.7, reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2007**

"3.1.x Operators shall ensure that pilots-in-command have ready access to the information provided in the appropriate Aeroplane Flight Manual. All data from the manual essential to continue flight to a safe landing shall be available under all operational circumstances.

**Note 1:** This requirement for information available during flight may be deemed to have been met if the essential data are given in the Operations Manual carried in accordance with 11.1.

**Note 2:** The essential data may be presented in a form other than printed paper. An acceptable standard of accessibility, usability and reliability must be assured."

**3.3 SAFETY MANAGEMENT**

**ICAO para 3.3** takes the form of a Note stating that *Annex 19 includes safety management provisions for air operators. Further guidance is contained in the Safety Management Manual (SMM) (Doc 9859).*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

If hazardous conditions, such as volcanic ash, exist for which neither adequate Standard Operating Procedures nor the required details of an operator's Safety Risk Assessment are available to the flight crew, the situation shall be treated like one where no Safety Risk Assessment has been carried out and operations shall be planned so that encounter with the hazard is avoided.

**POL-STAT 2011**

**CHAPTER 4 FLIGHT OPERATIONS****4.2 OPERATIONAL CERTIFICATION AND SUPERVISION****4.2.1 THE AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE**

ICAO para. 4.2.1.1 states that "*an operator shall not engage in commercial air transport operations unless in possession of a valid air operator certificate or equivalent document issued by the State of the Operator.*"

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

4.2.1.2 *The air operator certificate shall authorize the operator to conduct commercial air transport operations in accordance with the operations specifications.*

*Note.— Provisions for the content of the air operator certificate and its associated operations specifications are contained in 4.2.1.5 and 4.2.1.6.*

4.2.1.3 *The issue of an air operator certificate by the State of the Operator shall be dependent upon the operator demonstrating an adequate organization, method of control and supervision of flight operations, training programme as well as ground handling and maintenance arrangements consistent with the nature and extent of the operations specified.*

*Note.— Attachment E contains guidance on the issue of an air operator certificate."*

**IFALPA POLICY**

The present ICAO text requires the operator to establish a method of supervision of flight operations, which shall be approved by the State. This approach does not require the State to set out conditions which must be considered, as that might impose unrealistic and unnecessary burdens on some operators, whilst allowing others to evade necessary control because there is no explicit requirement to be met for some particular circumstance. This allows the operator to set his own limitations and conditions, but ensures that the State regulates them by the approval process.

A further sentence should be added to para. 4.2.1.3, reading:

"The operator shall provide the State of the Operator with a statement of the conditions in which it proposes to operate, including at least those factors specified in Annex 6, Part I. The anticipated operating conditions shall be approved by the State of the Operator."

**POL-STAT 1989**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

**4.2.3 OPERATIONS MANUAL**

**ICAO para. 4.2.3.1** states that "*an operator shall provide, for the use and guidance of operations personnel concerned, an operations manual in accordance with Appendix 2. The operations manual shall be amended or revised as is necessary to ensure that the information contained therein is kept up to date. All such amendments or revisions shall be issued to all personnel that are required to use this manual.*"

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**



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## IFALPA POLICY

An operator shall only provide information on techniques and procedures for the operation of the aircraft which have been approved by the Competent Authority responsible for the safe operation of aircraft.

**POL-STAT 2007**

The crew shall not be required by an operator to apply any unapproved techniques or procedures during any operations.

For any technique, or procedure which affects the technical operation of the aircraft to be considered as approved in the operations manual, the operator shall use the following process:

1. The technique or procedure shall firstly have been developed, or agreed as being acceptable, by the manufacturer or type certificate holder.
2. The technique or procedure developed in para (1) shall also require to be accepted by the Authority responsible for the issue of the type certificate.

When stages (1) and (2) have been met, the technique or procedure shall be approved, or accepted by the Competent Authority responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft.

### 4.2.4 OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS - GENERAL

**ICAO para. 4.2.4.1** states that *"an operator shall ensure that all operations personnel are properly instructed in their particular duties and responsibilities and the relationship of such duties to the operation as a whole."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

## IFALPA POLICY

The above sentence should be renumbered 4.2.4.1 b), with a new sentence under 4.2.4.1 a) reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2012**  
**(IND)**

"4.2.4.1 a) An operator shall employ the necessary flight crews to plan, perform, supervise, inspect and release the work to be performed.

Note: For the purpose of this subparagraph, employed means the person is directly employed as an individual by the operator."

## IFALPA POLICY

A new paragraph should be added after 4.2.4.1 reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 1980**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Jun**  
**2014**

### "4.2.4.x Flight Crew Duties - Categories II and III

Operations to Categories II and III limits shall require the promulgation of detailed flight duties for each member of the flight crew. In so far as is practicable these duties shall follow normal operating procedures."

The decision to carry out an automatic approach and landing should be entirely at the discretion of the pilot-in-command who will take into consideration such factors as system proving, crew training and proficiency.

**4.2.8 AERODROME OPERATING MINIMA**

ICAO para. 4.2.8.1 states that *"the State of the Operator shall require that the operator establish aerodrome operating minima for each aerodrome to be used in operations, and shall approve the method of determination of such minima. Such minima shall not be lower than any that may be established for such aerodromes by the State of the Aerodrome, except when specifically approved by that State.*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*Note. - This Standard does not require the State of the Aerodrome to establish aerodrome operating minima."*

ICAO para. 4.2.8.2 goes on to identify the factors that have to be taken into account when establishing aerodrome operating minima.

**IFALPA POLICY**

Approach and landing should not be carried out at an aerodrome where the RVR is below 550 metres (2000 ft.) unless the full required lighting systems are installed and the appropriate onboard technology is available.

**POL-STAT 2008**

**4.2.11 CREW**

ICAO para. 4.2.11 states as follows:

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*4.2.11.1 Pilot-in-command. For each flight, the operator shall designate one pilot to act as pilot-in-command.*

*4.2.11.2 For each flight of an aeroplane above 15 000 m (49 000 ft), the operator shall maintain records so that the total cosmic radiation dose received by each crew member over a period of 12 consecutive months can be determined.*

*Note.— Guidance on the maintenance of cumulative radiation records is given in Circular 126 — Guidance Material on SST Aircraft Operations.*

**IFALPA POLICY**

The first part of para. 4.2.11.2 should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 2014  
(HUPER)**

"4.2.11.2 For each flight of an aeroplane above 15 000 m (49 000 ft) **and/or 8 000 m (26 000 ft) in polar/sub polar regions**, the operator...."

The following sentence should also be added:

"For each flight of an aeroplane above 8 000 m (26 000 ft), the operator shall assess individual annual cosmic radiation doses. Crew members should have permanent access to these records."

**IFALPA POLICY****4.2.x PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON NON-STANDARD PROCEDURES**

**POL-STAT 2004  
Reaffirmed by  
ADO Cttee, Dec.  
2012**

A new sub-section should be added after 4.2.12 reading as follows:

"4.2.x An operator should provide the Air Navigation Service provider at the aerodrome with information on any non-standard contingency procedures in order that the Air Navigation Service can anticipate the likely flight path in the event of an engine failure or other emergency."

**4.3 FLIGHT PREPARATION**

ICAO para 4.3.1 states that *"a flight shall not be commenced until flight preparation forms have been completed certifying that the pilot-in command is satisfied that:*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

- a) the aeroplane is airworthy and the appropriate certificates (i.e airworthiness, registration) are on board the aeroplane;*
- b) the instruments and equipment prescribed in Chapter 6, for the particular type of operation to be undertaken, are installed and are sufficient for the flight;*
- c) a maintenance release as prescribed in 8.8 has been issued in respect of the aeroplane;*
- d) the mass of the aeroplane and centre of gravity location are such that the flight can be conducted safely, taking into account the flight conditions expected;*
- e) any load carried is properly distributed and safely secured;*
- f) a check has been completed indicating that the operating limitations of Chapter 5 can be complied with for the flight to be undertaken; and*
- g) the Standards of 4.3.3 relating to operational flight planning have been complied with."*

**IFALPA POLICY**

**POL-STAT 1998**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

New sub-paragraphs are required reading as follows:

- h) a check has been made of the purity of the fuel and of the water injection fluid, if any.*
- i) An operator shall provide the person who is conducting an exterior inspection of an aeroplane to determine its airworthiness with a means to check that all static ports and pitot tubes are fully clear. Any pitot type cover should be coloured in a manner that is conspicuous during both night and daylight hours. The covering and un-covering of the static ports and/or pitot tubes should be entered into the Technical Log Book (TLB)/Maintenance Log or equivalent.*

**Note:** It is considered that to meet this desire, the colour red is desirable and for the night requirement that it be luminous."

**4.3.8 REFUELLING WITH PASSENGERS ON BOARD**

**ICAO para. 4.3.8.1** states that *"an aeroplane shall not be refuelled when passengers are embarking, on board or disembarking unless it is properly attended by qualified personnel ready to initiate and direct an evacuation of the aeroplane by the most practical and expeditious means available.*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*4.3.8.2 When refuelling with passengers embarking, on board or disembarking, two-way communication shall be maintained by the aeroplane's inter-communication system or other suitable means between the ground crew supervising the refuelling and the qualified personnel on board the aeroplane.*

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*Note 1.— The provisions of 4.3.8.1 do not necessarily require the deployment of integral aeroplane stairs or the opening of emergency exits as a prerequisite to refuelling.*

*Note 2.— Provisions concerning aircraft refuelling are contained in Annex 14, Volume 1, and guidance on safe refuelling practices is contained in the Airport Services Manual, (Doc 9137), Parts 1 and 8.*

*Note 3.— Additional precautions are required when refuelling with fuels other than aviation kerosene or when refuelling results in a mixture of aviation kerosene with other aviation turbine fuels, or when an open line is used.*

## **IFALPA POLICY**

A new paragraph should be added, reading as follows:

"A flight crew member should be on the flight deck at all times that fuelling is in progress when passengers are on board the aircraft."

**POL-STAT 1982**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

### **4.X PROFILE GUIDANCE**

A new paragraph 4.x should be added to Chapter 4, reading as follows:

No turbojet powered aircraft operating on a commercial flight should make an approach to land without the provision of continuous profile guidance, unless in the opinion of the pilot-in-command, a greater hazard would be introduced.

**POL-STAT**  
**(pre-1975)**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2008*

## **4.4 IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES**

The following paragraphs should be added to Section 4.4:

### **4.4.A IN-FLIGHT PROCEDURES**

Cooperation should be established between operators and a medical institute to provide 24hr assistance for medical emergency situations on board aircraft.

Proper training should be provided to both the medical doctors and cabin crew in view of their co-operation, communication and the treatment of medical emergencies.

**POL-STAT 2011**

### **4.4.B USE OF REVERSE THRUST AFTER LANDING AND REJECTED TAKE-OFF**

Full reverse thrust if applied shall be available at the pilot's discretion without any environmental or procedural restrictions. Operators shall not put any restrictions on the use of full reverse thrust during landing and rejected take-off.

**POL-STAT 2014**

### **4.4.C OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR RATES OF CLIMB AND DESCENT**

Pilots shall not be required to make alterations to the autoflight system prior to the altitude capture phase in order to avoid unwarranted ACAS advisories.

**POL-STAT 2010**

## **4.5 DUTIES OF PILOT-IN-COMMAND**

ICAO para. 4.5.1 states that *"the pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the safety of all crew members, passengers and cargo on board when the doors are closed. The pilot-in-command shall also be responsible for the operation and safety of the aeroplane from the moment the aeroplane is ready to move for the purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight and the engine(s) used as primary propulsion units are shut down."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

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## IFALPA POLICY

The text should be extended by the addition of the following sub-paragraphs:

"4.5.1.1 To this end the pilot-in-command shall retain the right to fly the aircraft in accordance with the optimum procedures given in the Flight Manual and shall retain full authority for the application of allowances to take into account operational variables such as turbulence, condition of runway, etc.

4.5.1.2 The pilot-in-command shall be responsible for the efficiency and discipline of the flight crew and for the orderliness of passengers on board and shall be given full authority necessary to exercise these functions, including full powers of arrest. He shall also be given the right at all times to exclude passengers or crew from the aircraft.

4.5.1.3 In the event of serious occurrence involving the exercise of the powers given to him by 4.5.1.2 the pilot-in-command shall render a report on the matter at the next aerodrome of landing and request the appropriate local authorities to initiate any necessary legal proceedings."

### 4.6 DUTIES OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS OFFICER/FLIGHT DISPATCHER

ICAO para. 4.6.2 states that *"in the event of an emergency, a flight operations officer/flight dispatcher shall:*

- a) initiate such procedures as outlined in the operations manual while avoiding taking any action that would conflict with ATC procedures; and*
- b) convey safety-related information to the pilot-in-command that may be necessary for the safe conduct of the flight, including information related to any amendment to the flight plan that become necessary in the course of the flight."*

*Note.— It is equally important that the pilot-in-command also convey similar information to the flight operations officer/flight dispatcher during the course of the flight, particularly in the context of emergency situations.*

## IFALPA POLICY

IFALPA considers that this text should be replaced by the following:

"4.6.2 In performing his duties, a Flight Operations Officer shall not edit or restrict the meteorological or other operational information applicable to the flight and shall avoid taking any action that would conflict with the procedures established by the Air Traffic Service, the Meteorological Service, or the Communications Service.

*Note. The pilot-in-command does not subordinate considerations of safety to the recommendations of the Flight Operations Officer.*

**POL-STAT**  
(pre-1975)  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2008*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**POL-STAT 1975**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2014*

STATUS  
AND DATE**4.10 FATIGUE MANAGEMENT**

ICAO para. 4.10.1 states that *"the State of the Operator shall establish regulations for the purpose of managing fatigue. These regulations shall be based upon scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience with the aim of ensuring that flight and cabin crew members are performing at an adequate level of alertness. Accordingly, the State of the Operator shall establish:*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*a) regulations for flight time, flight duty period, duty period and rest period limitations; and*

*b) where authorizing an operator to use a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) to manage fatigue, FRMS regulations.*

**IFALPA POLICY**

**POL-STAT 2009  
(HUPER)**

Operators shall establish a fatigue management education programme on an initial and recurrent basis that instructs aircrew, schedulers, and management regarding fatigue. This programme shall cover the physiological manifestations of fatigue along with mitigation methods and personal counter measures, company fatigue policies and crew strategies. Flight crew should also be trained in the use of personal strategies to prepare and deal with fatigue-related issues.

## CHAPTER 5 AEROPLANE PERFORMANCE OPERATING LIMITATIONS

### 5.2 APPLICABLE TO AEROPLANES CERTIFICATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PART IIIA AND IIIB OF ANNEX 8

**ICAO para. 5.2.6** states that *"in applying the Standards of this chapter, account shall be taken of all factors that significantly affect the performance of the aeroplane, including, but not limited to: the mass of the aeroplane, the operating procedures, the pressure-altitude appropriate to the elevation of the aerodrome, the runway slope, the ambient temperature, the wind, and surface conditions of the runway at the expected time of use, i.e. presence of snow, slush, water and/or ice, for landplanes, water surface condition for seaplanes. Such factors shall be taken into account directly as operational parameters or indirectly by means of allowances or margins, which may be provided in the scheduling of performance data or in the comprehensive and detailed code of performance in accordance with which the aeroplane is being operated."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

#### IFALPA POLICY

A new Recommended Practice should be added to para. 5.2.6 reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2013**

**"5.2.6.1 Recommendation.** If a temperature inversion in the atmospheric layer between airfield elevation and 1,500 feet above airfield elevation is forecast or reported, the highest temperature should be taken into account for take off performance calculation."

**ICAO para. 5.2.8** is headed *"Take-off"* and states that *"the aeroplane shall be able, in the event of a critical engine failing, or for other reasons, at any point in the take-off, either to discontinue the take-off and stop within the accelerate-stop distance available, or to continue the take-off and clear all obstacles along the flight path by an adequate vertical or horizontal distance until the aeroplane is in a position to comply with 5.2.9. When determining the resulting take-off obstacle accountability area, the operating conditions, such as the crosswind component and navigation accuracy, must be taken into account."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**ICAO para. 5.2.9** is headed *"En-route - one engine inoperative"* and states that *"the aeroplane shall be able, in the event of the critical engine becoming inoperative at any point along the route or planned diversions therefrom, to continue the flight to an aerodrome at which the Standard of 5.2.11 can be met, without flying below the minimum flight altitude at any point."*

#### IFALPA POLICY

The pilot-in-command must be satisfied that the physical characteristics and ground aids provided at the aerodrome are adequate for the intended operation and that the prevailing conditions, particularly adverse weather which could affect both his and the aeroplane's performance, have been properly considered. Accordingly, the opening phrase of para. 5.2.8 should be amended to read:

**POL-STAT 1984**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Ctee, Nov**  
**2007**

**"5.2.8 Take-off.** The aeroplane shall be able, *with all power units operating as well as* in the event of a critical power unit failing ....."

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**ICAO para. 5.2.8.1** states that *"in determining the length of the runway available, account is taken of the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aeroplane prior to take-off."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

Para. 5.2.8.1 should be amended to read:

**POL-STAT 2008**

**"5.2.8.1 Take-off alignment distance.** In determining the length of the runway available, account shall be taken of the loss, if any, of runway length due to alignment of the aeroplane prior to take-off. This alignment distance should be demonstrated and be achievable in service."

A new sub-paragraph should be added to 5.2.8 reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2008**

In case of single system failures affecting the deceleration capability of the aeroplane, the aeroplane shall be able either to discontinue the take-off within the accelerate-stop distance, or to continue the take-off and clear all obstacles along the flight path by an adequate margin until the aeroplane is in a position to comply with 5.2.9."

*Note. - In complying with 5.2.8.2 a single speed value appropriate for rejecting the take-off in case of such failures as addressed in 5.2.8.2 should be presented to the flight crew. This speed value should be valid for the complete range of certified take-off weights and ambient operating conditions. For the continuation of the take-off in case of such failures as addressed in 5.2.8.2 the take-off path may be determined assuming all engines are operating.*

A further new sub-paragraph should be added to 5.2.8 reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 1982**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

**Intersection Departures.** Acceptance of an intersection departure shall be entirely at the discretion of the pilot-in-command and based on his own judgement taking account of the prevailing operational circumstances."

A further new sub-paragraph should be added to 5.2.8 reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 1986**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Nov*  
*2007*

The vertical and horizontal survey accuracies shall be applied in the most critical direction as an additive (vertical is a plus value, horizontal is applied in the direction which most adversely affects the procedure) to each obstacle when determining the effect upon obstacle clearance climb gradient requirements.



## CHAPTER 6 AEROPLANE INSTRUMENTS, EQUIPMENT AND FLIGHT DOCUMENTS

### 6.1 GENERAL

#### MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST

The following proposal seeks to ensure that operations involving aircraft which have unserviceable instruments, equipment or systems are properly based on an established procedure. Most responsible operators do follow very strict procedures in this regard; however, there is evidence to show that some do not.

1. The Minimum Equipment List (MEL), based on the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) related to the specific model of aircraft and adequate for the operation, should be available on board the aircraft for reference by the pilot.
2. The MEL should be developed with full participation by the line pilots involved in the operations.
3. The MEL should clearly and prominently state the authority of the pilot-in-command to require a higher level of serviceability than the minimum.

### 6.2 ALL AEROPLANES ON ALL FLIGHTS

ICAO para. 6.2.2 lists the items with which an aeroplane shall be equipped, and includes: (...)

*b) portable fire extinguishers of a type which, when discharged, will not cause dangerous contamination of the air within the aeroplane. At least one shall be located in:*

- 1) the pilot's compartment; and*
- 2) each passenger compartment that is separate from the pilot's compartment and that is not readily accessible to the flight crew;*

#### IFALPA POLICY

Sub-para. 1) should be reworded to read as follows:

"1) the pilot's compartment, in a location accessible from either pilot station under all conditions (including whilst wearing oxygen masks; and"

Because food preparation constitutes a major fire hazard, the following subparagraphs should be added to para. b):

- x) the near vicinity of each galley or area where cooking or food heating appliances may be operated.
- y) each emergency exit of the passenger cabin, in order to facilitate a rapid response

The following sentence should also be added:

Such extinguishers should be easily and rapidly accessible, and capable of extinguishing any fire likely to occur therein.

**POL-STAT 1985**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jul*  
*2015*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**POL-STAT 2012**

STATUS  
AND DATE**IFALPA POLICY**

The following items should also be added to para. 6.2.2:

"f) a public address system when this forms part of the emergency equipment.

**Note.-** Small aeroplanes may not require a P.A. system; therefore the standard should only apply where such equipment is necessary for emergency situations.

g) an aircraft interphone system."

**6.3 FLIGHT RECORDERS**

Note 1 to para. 6.3 states that "*crash protected flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: a flight data recorder (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), an airborne image recorder (AIR) and/or a data link recorder (DLR). Image and data link information may be recorded on either the CVR or the FDR.*"

**POL-STAT 1999**

*Reaffirmed by  
ADO Cttee, Jun  
2008*

*Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)*

**IFALPA POLICY**

1. Flight recorders should be capable of continuous recording during and after any failure of any or all of the aircraft systems and should continue to record for such minimum period of time as is deemed necessary after the failure of all aircraft systems, using a self-contained source.

**POL-STAT 1995**

*Reaffirmed by  
AAP Cttee, Nov  
2010*

2. Flight recorders should not increase the workload of the crew in flight.

3. Until such time that the aviation industry is able to guarantee the protection of flight recorders data, IFALPA will remain opposed to the transmission of real-time information from the flight recorders to the ground via data-link or other means.

**POL-STAT 2011****6.3.1 Flight data recorders and aircraft data recording systems****6.3.1.4 Duration**

**ICAO para 6.3.1.4** states that "*all FDRs shall be capable of retaining the information recorded during at least the last 25 hours of their operation, except for the Type IIA FDR which shall be capable of retaining the information recorded during at least the last 30 minutes of its operation.*"

*Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)*

**IFALPA POLICY**

The above paragraph should be amended as follows:

"All FDRs shall be capable of retaining sufficient flight data history in order to detect progressive deterioration and identify failures attributable to previous events."

**POL-STAT 2011  
(AAP)**

**6.3.2 Cockpit voice recorders and cockpit audio recording systems****6.3.2.1 Operation**

**ICAO para 6.3.2.1.4** states that *all aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 5 700 kg for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued on or after 1 January 1987 shall be equipped with a CVR.*

*Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)*

**IFALPA POLICY**

The following recommendation should be added to the above standard:

Whilst the aircraft is on the ground, the pilots should be provided with a means to erase the CVR or, in the case of solid state recorders, to render the recorder data inaccessible by normal techniques. Information erased by bulk erasure should only be recovered at the sole request of the investigating authority and of no other person or body.

**POL-STAT 1995**

*Reaffirmed by  
AAP Cttee, Nov  
2010*

STATUS  
AND DATE**6.5 ALL AEROPLANES ON FLIGHTS OVER WATER****6.5.1 SEAPLANES**

ICAO para. 6.5.1 states that *"all seaplanes for all flights shall be equipped with:*

*a) one life jacket, or equivalent individual flotation device, for each person on board, stowed in a position easily accessible from the seat or berth of the person for whose use it is provided; ..."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

The words *"... or equivalent individual flotation device"* should be deleted from sub-para. a)

**POL-STAT 1983**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Jul**  
**2015**

**6.5.3 ALL AEROPLANES ON LONG-RANGE OVER-WATER FLIGHTS**

ICAO para. 6.5.3.2 states that *"each life-jacket and equivalent individual flotation device, when carried in accordance with 6.5.1 a), 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.2, shall be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the locations of persons, except where the requirement of 6.5.2.1 c) is met by the provision of individual flotation devices other than life-jackets."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

The reference to *"individual flotation devices"* should be removed from this text, which should then be related to night conditions and should read:

**POL-STAT 1981**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Jun**  
**2008**

*"6.5.3.2 Each life jacket, when carried in accordance with 6.5.1 a), 6.5.2.1 and 6.5.2.2, shall be equipped with a means of electric illumination for the purpose of facilitating the location of persons at night."*

**6.11 PRESSURISED AEROPLANES WHEN CARRYING PASSENGERS - WEATHER RADAR**

ICAO para. 6.11 recommends that *"pressurised aeroplanes when carrying passengers should be equipped with operative weather radar whenever such aeroplanes are being operated in areas where thunderstorms or other potentially hazardous weather conditions, regarded as detectable with airborne weather radar, may be expected to exist along the route either at night or under instrument meteorological conditions."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

The carriage of passengers is unrelated to the potential hazards from meteorological phenomena. Accordingly, para. 6.11 should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 1980**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Dec.**  
**2012**

*"6.11 All commercial transport aeroplanes should be equipped with operative weather radar capable of giving warning to the pilot of the presence of cumulonimbus cloud or other potentially hazardous meteorological conditions regarded as detectable with airborne weather radar. Where dual weather radar displays are not installed, the single weather radar display should be positioned so that it is readily and easily accessible to both pilots from their duty station."*

## 6.12 ALL AEROPLANES OPERATED ABOVE 15000 M (49000 FT) - RADIATION INDICATOR

ICAO para. 6.12 states that "All aeroplanes intended to be operated above 15000 m (49000 ft) shall carry equipment to measure and indicate continuously the dose rate of total cosmic radiation being received (i.e. the total ionizing and neutron radiation of galactic and solar origin) and the cumulative dose on each flight. The display unit of the equipment shall be readily visible to flight crew members." **Ax. 6, 9th Ed. (inc. Amdt 40, Jul 2016)**

Note.- The equipment is calibrated on the basis of assumptions acceptable to the appropriate national authorities."

### IFALPA POLICY

The title of para. 6.12 should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 2014  
(HUPER)**

"6.12 All aeroplanes Operated Above 15000 m (49 000 ft) **and/or 8000 m (26 000 ft) in polar/sub polar regions**"

The first part of para. 6.12 should also be amended to read as follows:

"6.12 All aeroplanes intended to be operated above 15 000 m (49 000 ft) **and/or 8 000 m (26 000 ft) in polar/sub polar regions** shall carry...."

The following paragraph should also be added:

"Dose rate warning devices onboard aircraft

All aeroplanes intended to be operated above 15 000 m (49 000 ft) and/or 8000 m (26000 ft) in polar/sub polar regions, especially long-range aircraft, should be equipped with a warning device to detect sudden increases in dose rate. The display of such device should be clearly visible to the flight crew to allow timely response to suddenly increased levels of dose rates."

## 6.15 AEROPLANES REQUIRED TO BE EQUIPPED WITH GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEMS (GPWS)

ICAO para 6.15.5 recommends that "all turbine-engined aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass of 5 700 kg or less and authorized to carry more than five but not more than nine passengers should be equipped with a ground proximity warning system which provides the warnings of 6.15.8 a) and c), warning of unsafe terrain clearance and a forward looking terrain avoidance function." **Ax. 6, 9th Ed. (inc. Amdt 40, Jul 2016)**

ICAO para. 6.15.8 states that "a ground proximity warning system shall provide, unless otherwise specified herein, warnings of the following circumstances:

- a) excessive descent rate;
- b) excessive terrain closure rate;
- c) excessive altitude loss after take-off or go-around;
- d) unsafe terrain clearance while not in landing configuration;
  - 1) gear not locked down
  - 2) flaps not in landing position; and
- e) excessive descent below the instrument glide path.

**IFALPA POLICY**

The following amendments should be made:

**POL-STAT 2008**

- The recommendation in paragraph 6.15.5 should be upgraded to a standard.
- The GPWS should be coupled to a Terrain Position and Awareness System with a 3D terrain depiction (including man-made obstacles) on the primary flight displays (eg. PFD, ND, HUD). The depiction function should be selectable by the crew during all phases of flight.

**6.17 EMERGENCY LOCATOR TRANSMITTER (ELT)**

ICAO para 6.17 reads as follows:

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

*6.17.1 Recommendation.— All aeroplanes should carry an automatic ELT.*

*6.17.2 Except as provided for in 6.17.3, all aeroplanes authorized to carry more than 19 passengers shall be equipped with at least one automatic ELT or two ELTs of any type.*

*6.17.3 All aeroplanes authorized to carry more than 19 passengers for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued after 1 July 2008 shall be equipped with either:*

- a) at least two ELTs, one of which shall be automatic; or*
- b) at least one ELT and a capability that meets the requirements of 6.18.*

*Note.— In the case where the requirements for 6.18 are met by another system no automatic ELT is required.*

**IFALPA POLICY**

Paras. 6.17.2 and 6.17.3 should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 2008**

6.17.2 Except as provided for in 6.17.3, all aeroplanes authorized to carry more than 19 passengers shall be equipped with at least two automatic Deployable and Floatable ELTs (ELT (ADF)).

6.17.3 All aeroplanes authorized to carry more than 19 passengers for which the individual certificate of airworthiness is first issued after 1 July 2008 shall be equipped with at least two automatic Deployable and Floatable ELTs (ELT (ADF)).

## CHAPTER 7 AEROPLANE COMMUNICATION, NAVIGATION AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

### 7.2 NAVIGATION EQUIPMENT

ICAO para 7.2.1 states that *"an aeroplane shall be provided with navigation equipment which will enable it to proceed:*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

- a) *in accordance with its operational flight plan; and*
- b) *in accordance with the requirements of air traffic services;*

*except when, if not so precluded by the appropriate authority, navigation for flights under VFR is accomplished by visual reference to landmarks."*

#### IFALPA POLICY

In sub-para. a) of this text, *"operational flight plan"* should be replaced by *"ATC flight plan"*.

**POL-STAT 1981**  
**(ATS)**

#### IFALPA POLICY

Two new sections should be added to Chapter 7.2, reading as follows:

#### USE OF GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM - JURISDICTION AND CONTROL

**POL-STAT 1993**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2013*

If the use of a global navigation satellite system is accepted as an international standard for air navigation, it should fall under the jurisdiction of, and be controlled by, an international civil organisation.

#### TERMINAL AREA RNAV/RNP OPERATIONS

**POL-STAT 2004**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

For RNAV/RNP procedures for operation in the terminal area, pilots should be provided with information from independent source(s) that will permit confirmation of position including the required navigation performance. Such procedures should be contained in the Operations Manual. These procedures should also be applied to contingency procedures.

**Note:** Pilots should be aware of possible programming errors and cross-check the FMS position with an independent source."

## CHAPTER 8 AEROPLANE MAINTENANCE

### 8.1 OPERATOR'S MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITY

ICAO para 8.1.5 states that *the operator shall ensure that the maintenance of its aeroplanes is performed in accordance with the maintenance programme.*"

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

#### IFALPA POLICY

The following recommendation should be added:

A pre-flight inspection done by other than approved maintenance personnel should *not* be part of the scheduled maintenance programme.

**POL-STAT 1989**  
**Reaffirmed by**  
**ADO Cttee, Dec.**  
**2012**

**CHAPTER 9 AEROPLANE FLIGHT CREW****9.1 COMPOSITION OF THE FLIGHT CREW**

ICAO para. 9.1.1 states that *"the number and composition of the flight crew shall not be less than that specified in the operations manual. The flight crews shall include flight crew members in addition to the minimum numbers specified in the flight manual or other documents associated with the certificate of airworthiness, when necessitated by considerations related to the type of aeroplane used, the type of operation involved and the duration of flight between points where flights crews are changed."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

There should be a minimum of two pilots on duty in the flight deck on all commercial air transport aircraft in all phases of flight.

**POL-STAT 2008**

*Note 1. The above provisions do not prevent one of the pilots from leaving the flight deck for a short time for physiological needs.*

*Note 2. IFALPA requirements for two pilots on all commercial aircraft include those aircraft certificated for single pilot IFR operations, when engaged in commercial operations, such as commuter, feeder or small charter services.*

**9.1.4. FLIGHT NAVIGATOR**

ICAO para. 9.1.4 states that *"the flight crew shall include at least one member who holds a flight navigator licence in all operations where, as determined by the State of the Operator, navigation necessary for the safe conduct of the flight cannot be adequately accomplished by the pilots from the pilot station."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40,  
Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

A Note should be added to the ICAO text reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2008**

**"Note:** Where navigation is performed without a flight navigator as part of the operating crew, the pilots shall be fully trained and qualified on all the navigational equipment to be used."

**9.4.4 PILOT PROFICIENCY CHECKS**

ICAO para. 9.4.4 states that *"An operator shall ensure that piloting technique and the ability to execute emergency procedures is checked in such a way as to demonstrate the pilot's competence on each type or variant of a type of aeroplane. Where the operation may be conducted under instrument flight rules, an operator shall ensure that the pilot's competence to comply with such rules is demonstrated to either a check pilot of the operator or to a representative of the State of the Operator. Such checks shall be performed twice within any period of one year. Any two such checks which are similar and which occur within a period of four consecutive months shall not alone satisfy this requirement."*

**IFALPA POLICY**

A new paragraph should be added:

**POL-STAT 2011**

**9.4.4.x CRM**

IFALPA recognizes the substantial benefits arising from training of non-technical skills and supports the continued instruction and reinforcement of CRM on a regular basis.



IFALPA encourages the development of training programmes which will equip facilitators / instructors with the complex skills required to successfully discuss CRM issues with crews.

**Note:** Checking of individuals for this policy is the same as jeopardy assessment and includes any method of evaluation or testing that could result in failure.

When first introduced, a cornerstone in the acceptance for CRM training was the assurance that CRM should be without checking. Much of the value and strength of CRM is based on this principle.

The introduction of any checking or assessment process has the potential to destroy such benefits. IFALPA therefore opposes any assessment process of any aspect of non-technical elements.

IFALPA supports feedback and discussion between facilitator / instructor and flight crew on CRM topics. This feedback should be non-numerical (e.g. “Enhanced – Standard – Detracted).

IFALPA recognizes that a high level of trust and openness for such discussions. For CRM training to genuinely impact on the safety culture in aviation it must be wholeheartedly embraced by the pilots.

IFALPA believes that to introduce jeopardy assessment or checking of CRM at this point would fundamentally change the facilitator / instructor and flight crew relationship and potentially block the many benefits to be gained from CRM training.

Note: Jeopardy Assessment or checking CRM may result in crews producing acceptable CRM behavior in the simulator but have little real impact on the safety culture of the airline.

**CHAPTER 11    MANUELS, LOGS AND RECORDS****AVAILABILITY**

In line with current CRM and safety standards, air crew should have access to pertinent Flight Documentation at all times before any given flight, for the purpose of individual flight preparation. This may be either in the form of personal manuals or software, or in the availability of a briefing room, library or distribution centre for self-briefing at the operators home base.

**POL-STAT 1997**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Jun*  
*2008*

On board the aircraft all critical documentation (e.g. SID, STAR, check-lists etc.) should be readily available to all flight crew members. In the case of on-board electronic flight information and library systems, back-ups must be provided.

Note.- Unless the electronic flight information and library system is a certified redundant system, the back-up should be a hard copy.

**ELECTRONIC FLIGHT BAGS (EFB)**

**POL-STAT 2009**

**Preamble**

An EFB is an electronic device intended for flight crew functions traditionally accomplished using paper references (e.g., operating manuals, aeronautical charts, performance calculations). In addition, the EFB may host other applications that have no paper equivalent e.g., a video surveillance system.

IFALPA favours the use of fixed installed (either mounted [class 2] or integrated [class 3]) systems on the flight deck. However, an EFB must not have write access to critical aircraft systems.

**Availability**

There shall be one EFB system for each flight crew member required by certification. If EFB usage is required by operators SOPs during flight, EFB data shall be available at all times.

Failure cases (Back Up):

a.     **Single EFB System Failure**

If data cannot be provided by the remaining EFB system to other crewmembers (e.g. direct line of sight, readability), the operator shall provide other means (e.g. backup system, paper charts, printer).

b.     **Software Failure / Malicious Update**

For software failures, which may occur simultaneously, there shall be means to reuse the last running configuration (e.g. partition prior to update).

**Privacy / Data security**

IFALPA requires "best industry practice" for protection of all data (e.g., generation of data, data transfer, data storage), linked to operation of the aircraft. When this is not possible, the usage of data shall be restricted to data which does not influence operational safety or privacy of the flight crew.

The following actions are suggested; this list is not exhaustive:

- Physical, state of the art protection of hardware
- State of the art encryption of data, especially during data transfer
- Creation of elements of a crime in the applicable law, which prosecute the abuse of data.
- Prohibition of Hard- and Software, which enables the abuse of data.

The operator may not record or monitor the individual-related usage or operation by flight crew. Any electronic performance monitoring and/or control of flight-crew behaviour is prohibited.

### **Performance Monitoring**

The operator shall ensure the system performance according to its certification of an EFB throughout its lifetime. This includes especially issues of latency and processing time after updates of the applications or the operating system.

In the case of Class 1 EFBs, the size and mass of the units should not make their use prohibitive during periods of non normal activity and turbulence. **POL-STAT 2012**

**CHAPTER 13 SECURITY**

The criteria applied to aircraft design, certification and operation should encompass the principles of reducing acts of unlawful interference and aid in bringing any such acts to a safe conclusion.

**POL-STAT 2013  
(SEC)**

**13.2 SECURITY OF THE FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT**

ICAO para. 13.2.1 states that *"in all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door, this door shall be capable of being locked, and means shall be provided by which cabin crew can discreetly notify the flight crew in the event of suspicious activity or security breaches in the cabin."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40, Jul  
2016)**

*13.2.2 All passenger-carrying aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door that is designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door shall be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station."*

**IFALPA POLICY**

The first part of paragraph 13.2.2 should be amended to read:

**POL-STAT 2013  
(SEC)**

"All **public transport** aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass in excess of 45 500 kg or with a passenger seating capacity greater than 60 shall be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door **and bulkhead** that (...)"

Furthermore, the following sentence should be added at the end of this paragraph:

"Where this is technically not feasible other means shall be provided to secure the cockpit area."

A note should also be added after paragraph 13.2.2, reading as follows:

"Note.- Enhancing the security of flight deck doors is not considered to be a substitute for proper and adequate ground security and pre-boarding screening and control."

ICAO para. 13.2.3 states that *"in all aeroplanes which are equipped with a flight crew compartment door in accordance with paragraph 13.2.2:*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.  
(inc. Amdt 40, Jul  
2016)**

*a) this door shall be closed and locked from the time all external doors are closed following embarkation until any such door is opened for disembarkation, except when necessary to permit access and egress by authorized persons; and*

*b) means shall be provided for monitoring from either pilot's station the entire door area outside the flight crew compartment to identify persons requesting entry and to detect suspicious behaviour or potential threat.*

**IFALPA POLICY**

A further sub-paragraph c) should be added, reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2011  
(SEC)**

"c) A Secondary Barrier system shall be fitted to provide additional protection against an attack upon the flight deck during times when the flight deck door is opened in flight. Such system should have the ability to delay and deter unauthorised persons from entering the flight deck during the time when the flight deck door is open."

STATUS  
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ICAO para. 13.2.4 recommends that *"all passenger-carrying aeroplanes should be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment door, where practicable, that is designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. This door should be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station."*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40, Jul 2016)**

### IFALPA POLICY

The above paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 2012**  
**(SEC)**

"All commercial transport aeroplanes should be equipped with an approved flight crew compartment (door, bulkhead and floor) designed to resist penetration by small arms fire and grenade shrapnel, and to resist forcible intrusions by unauthorized persons. The cockpit door should be capable of being locked and unlocked from either pilot's station."

An additional paragraph should be added, reading as follows:

**POL-STAT 2006**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*ADO Cttee, Dec.*  
*2012*

### Operation of the cockpit door

The door command interface should be integrated in the aircraft centralised warning system, and the "unlocked" status should be annunciated. Request for access to the flight deck should take the form of a visual alert, followed by a sound alert after a set delay. Unlocking, opening, closing and locking the reinforced cockpit door must be quiet enough so as not to disturb the work of the flight crew or the resting flight crew in any adjacent crew rest area.

### 13.3 AEROPLANE SEARCH PROCEDURE CHECKLIST

**ICAO para. 13.3** states: *An operator shall ensure that there is on board a checklist of the procedures to be followed in searching for a bomb in case of suspected sabotage and for inspecting aeroplanes for concealed weapons, explosives, or other dangerous devices when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aeroplane may be the object of an act of unlawful interference. The checklist shall be supported by guidance on the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb or suspicious object be found and information on the least-risk bomb location specific to the aeroplane.*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

### IFALPA POLICY

**POL-STAT 2015**  
**(SEC)**

The above paragraphs should be amended as follows:

An operator shall ensure that there is on board a checklist of the procedures to be followed in searching for a bomb in case of suspected sabotage and for inspecting aeroplanes for concealed weapons, explosives, ***chemical/biological weapons*** or other dangerous devices when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aeroplane may be the object of an act of unlawful interference.

The checklist shall be supported by guidance on the appropriate course of action to be taken should a bomb, ***chemical/biological weapons*** or suspicious object be found, and information on the least-risk bomb location specific to the aeroplane.

STATUS  
AND DATE

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

### 13.6 MISCELLANEOUS

ICAO para. 13.6 has the two following recommendations:

**13.6.1 Recommendation.**— *Specialized means of attenuating and directing the blast should be provided for use at the least-risk bomb location.*

**13.6.2 Recommendation.**— *Where an operator accepts the carriage of weapons removed from passengers, the aeroplane should have provision for stowing such weapons in a place so that they are inaccessible to any person during flight time.*

### IFALPA POLICY

The following recommendations should be added:

#### **Means of restraint on board aircraft**

All passenger carrying aircraft should be equipped with passenger restraining equipment (e.g. handcuffs) readily accessible to crew members but concealed from other persons. Practical instruction and training in the appropriate use of such equipment should be mandatory.

Note.- The Tokyo Convention empowers the aircraft commander to restrain and/or disembark unruly passengers.

There should be no public facilities in the area immediately behind the cockpit door.

**POL-STAT 2001**  
*Reaffirmed by*  
*SEC Cttee, Mar*  
*2011*

**POL-STAT 2011**  
**(SEC)**

#### **New Large Aircraft (NLA)**

New Large Aircraft should incorporate specially designated areas where unexpected medical cases or unruly passengers can be accommodated safely.

1. NLA should have a double-door security system. One toilet and a minimum of one cockpit crew rest facility area should be located forward of the rearmost door. The double-door system should not hinder emergency operation.

2. Existing Large Aircraft should be modified to meet the provisions in 1. above.

3. Any other crew rest facilities should be equipped with lockable doors.

**POL-STAT 2009**  
**(SEC)**

#### **Discrete communications**

In order to aid with the resolution of acts of acts of unlawful interference, all aircraft should have the capability of providing discrete means of external communications with the flight crew whilst the aircraft is on the ground.

**POL-STAT 2013**  
**(SEC)**

STATUS  
AND DATE

**ATTACHMENT A - MEDICAL SUPPLIES**  
*Supplementary to Chapter 6, 6.2.2 a)*

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**1. TYPES**

*1.2 Based on the limited available evidence, only a very small number of passengers are likely to benefit from the carriage of automated external defibrillators (AED) on aeroplanes. However, many operators carry them because they offer the only effective treatment for cardiac fibrillation. The likelihood of use, and therefore of potential benefit to a passenger, is greatest in aircraft carrying a large number of passengers, over long duration sector lengths. The carriage of AEDs should be determined by operators on the basis of a risk assessment taking into account the particular needs of the operation.*

**Ax. 6, 9th Ed.**  
**(inc. Amdt 40,**  
**Jul 2016)**

**IFALPA POLICY**

The last sentence of the above paragraph should be amended to read as follows:

**POL-STAT 2011**

"The carriage of AEDs should be commensurate with the number of passengers the aeroplane is certified to carry.